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CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES:
HADLEY v. BAXENDALE UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Paul S. Turner*
For my own part I think that, although an excellent attempt was
made in Hadley v. Baxendale to lay down a rule on the subject [of
damages], it will be found that the rule is not capable of meeting all
cases; and when the matter comes to be further considered, it will
probably turn out that there is no such thing as a rule, as to the legal
consequences of damages, applicable in all cases.
-Wilde, B.1
The term "consequential damages" has often been used with respect
to harm suffered as a "consequence" of the breach of duty, but not
as a direct and immediate and foreseeable consequence. The use of
this expression should be abandoned.
-Arthur Linton Corbin2
The use of this term "consequential damage" "prolongs the dispute,"
and "introduces an equivocation which is fatal to any hope of a clear
settlement." It means both damage which is so remote as not to be
actionable, and damage which is actionable. Sometimes it is used to
denote damage, which, though actionable, does not follow immedi-
ately, in point of time, upon the doing of the act complained of; what
ERLE, C.J., aptly terms "consequential damages to the actionable
degree." 3
"Consequential" or "special" damages... are not defined in terms in
the Code, but are used in the sense given them by the leading cases
* Paul S. Turner is a retired Assistant General Counsel of Occidental Petroleum
Corporation. He has served as an official advisor and participant in the drafting of U.C.C.
Articles 3, 4, 4A, and 5 and practices law and consults on banking and commercial legal
matters in Los Angeles, California. His books and articles include LAw OF PAYMENT SYS-
TEMS AND EFT (Aspen Law & Business 1999) and STANDBY AND COMMERCIAL LETTERS
OF CREDIT (Aspen Law & Business 1996) (co-author). Mr. Turner wishes to acknowledge
gratefully the comments of Richard L. Field of Cliffside Park, New Jersey and George
Hisert of San Francisco, California.
1. Note, An Economic Approach to Hadley v. Baxendale, 62 NEB. L. REV. 157 (1983)
(quoting Sir James Plaisted Wilde, Baron Judge of the Court of Exchequer, in Gee and
Others v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co., 6 H. & N. 211, 220-21, 158 Eng. Rep. 87, 91
(1860)) [hereinafter An Economic Approach].
2. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1011, at 87 (1964) [herein-
after CORBIN ON CONTRACTS].
3. Eaton v. B. C. & M. R. R., 51 N.H. 504, 519 (1872).
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on the subject. 4
RTICLE 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code contains general
provisions, including definitions and interpretative principles,
that apply to all other articles in the U.C.C. In the summer of
2000, at the annual meeting of the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws, a draft of a revised version of Article 1 was
presented to the uniform law commissioners. 5 The commissioners are ex-
pected to approve a revised version of Article 1 in substantially the form
of the 2000 Annual Meeting Draft and present it to legislatures of the
various states.6
The subject of damages is addressed in section 1-305(a) of the 2000
Annual Meeting Draft of Article 1 in the following sentence:
The remedies provided by [the Uniform Commercial Code] must be
liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put
in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed but
neither consequential or special damages nor penal damages may be
had except as specifically provided in [the Uniform Commercial
Code] or by other rule of law.7
The damages provision in the 2000 Annual Meeting Draft of section 1-
305 (quoted above) does not differ substantively in any way from its ap-
posite section 1-106(1) of the current version of Article 1.8 Neither ver-
sion defines the damages terms that are used, i.e., "remedies,"
"consequential damages,"9 "special damages," and "penal damages."
This paper considers the use of the term "consequential damages" by
practitioners and in the U.C.C. What is meant by the term? What dam-
ages are meant to be included or excluded under the U.C.C. provisions
pertaining to consequential damages? If there is any ambiguity that
makes these questions difficult to answer, should the drafters of the re-
vised U.C.C. Article 1 seek to resolve it?
Part I of this paper discusses the treatment of consequential damages
under the common law. Part II reviews the use of the term in the U.C.C.
Part 3 conveys some of the author's thoughts on the issues raised in Parts
I and II.
4. See U.C.C. § 1-106, cmt. 3 (1995).
5. A draft U.C.C. Article presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting is referred to in this
paper as the "2000 Annual Meeting Draft."
6. Prior to preseatation to the legislatures, the co-sponsoring American Law Institute
must approve the draft.
7. U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (Proposed Draft 2000).
8. See U.C.C. § 1-106(1) currently provides: "The remedies provided by this Act shall
be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a
position as if the other party had fully performed but neither consequential or special dam-
ages nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other
rule of law." Id.
9. U.C.C. H8 2-715 and 2A-520, however, state, confusingly, as will be shown below,
what the term "consequential damages" includes. Consequential damages under Articles 2
and 2A would include other damages as well as those specified in §§ 2-715 and 2A-520.
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I. CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES UNDER THE COMMON LAW
A. HADLEY V. BAXENDALE
In Hadley v. Baxendale,10 millers in nineteenth century Greenwich, En-
gland, contracted with the owners of a factory in Gloucester, England, to
have the factory build a crankshaft to replace the broken crankshaft used
to operate the mill. The factory owners asked the millers to ship the bro-
ken shaft to the factory in Gloucester before work on the new shift was to
begin so that the new crankshaft would fit the other parts of the mill. In
arranging for the shipment, the millers contracted with the defendants,
who were common carriers for hire from Greenwich to Gloucester, to
have the broken shaft delivered to the factory in Gloucester.
The carriers, by neglect, delivered the broken shaft to the factory five
days later than the two days agreed upon. As a result of this delay, the
completion of the new shaft was delayed. The millers alleged in their suit
against the carriers that because of the delay in completion, the mill was
unable to operate as it otherwise would have been. In particular, the
millers sought to recover damages for their inability to supply their cus-
tomers with flour during the period of delay. They asserted that they had
been obliged to purchase flour to supply to some of their customers, de-
prived of gains and profits, and unable to employ their workforce, to
whom they were compelled to pay wages during the period of delay.
The carriers' defense in the litigation was that the damages sought by
the millers were too remote. The judge referred the legal issues, as well
as the fact-finding, to the jury, which was the common practice then, and
the jury awarded damages of fifty pounds to the millers. On appeal, the
Court of the Exchequer ordered a new trial, and for the guidance of the
lower court and future courts, enunciated the general rule of recoverable
damages followed by Anglo-American courts to this day.
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has bro-
ken the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of
such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably
be considered as either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual
course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may
reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both
parties at the time they made the contract as the probable result of
the breach of it. If special circumstances under which the contract
was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the de-
fendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting
from the breach of such a contract which they would reasonably con-
template would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily fol-
low from a breach of contract under the special circumstances so
known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special
circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the con-
tract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have had in his con-
10. 9 Exch. 341,156 E. R. 145 (1854) (reprinted in ALL E. R. REP. 1843-1860, 461
(G.F.L. Bridgman ed., Butterworth & Co. Ltd. 1965)).
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templation the amount of injury which would arise generally, and in
the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circum-
stances, from such a breach of contract. For, had the special circum-
stances been known, the parties might have specially provided for
the breach of contract by special terms as to the damages in that
case; and of this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them.II
The court concluded on the facts before it that the plaintiffs had com-
municated only that the article to be carried was the broken shaft and
that the plaintiffs were the millers of the mill. These facts alone, the court
held, could not lead the defendant carriers to contemplate that lost prof-
its would result from a delay in the delivery of the broken shaft. Thus,
the defendant carriers were entitled to a new trial. The term "conse-
quential damages" does not appear anywhere in the court's opinion.
B. EVRA v. Swiss BANK
The leading contemporary case on consequential damages involves a
bank's failure to comply with instructions to make a wire transfer. The
case, decided before the adoption of U.C.C. Article 4A on wire transfers,
is Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp.12 In Evra, Hyman-Michaels Company,
a Chicago dealer in scrap metals, had chartered a ship, the Pandora. The
charter required Hyman-Michaels to pay the charter installments into the
account of the Pandora owners at the Bank de Paris et des Pays-Bas in
Geneva. Hyman-Michaels would normally pay the installments by send-
ing wire transfer instructions to its bank, Continental Illinois Bank, in
Chicago. The instructions would then be sent by Continental to its
London office, then sent from the London office to Continental's corre-
spondent, Swiss Bank in Geneva, and finally sent from Swiss Bank to the
Bank de Paris in Geneva for the credit of the Pandora's owners. The flow
of these payment instructions is illustrated below.
11. Id. at 151; ALL E.R. REP.1843-1860, at 465.
12. 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982).
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Because vessel charter rates had increased sharply after the charter for
the Pandora was entered into, the owners wished to terminate Hyman-
Michaels' rights under the charter. Thus, when the payment due in Octo-
ber 1972 was late, the owners sent a notice of termination to Hyman-
Michaels. The notice was rejected by Hyman-Michaels, however, and the
ensuing dispute was referred to a panel of arbitrators appointed pursuant
to the charter. The panel, noting that arbitrators were inclined to show
latitude towards charters, ruled that the charter had not been terminated.
In the following year, the Pandora owners were afforded another op-
portunity to terminate the charter. A payment, due on April 26 in the
amount of $27,000, was not received by the vessel owners by that date.
Hyman-Michaels in Chicago had issued payment instructions on April 25,
and a telex from Continental Bank in London was sent on April 26th to
Swiss Bank in Geneva. However, the telex failed to reach the appropri-
ate banking personnel at Swiss Bank. The Swiss Bank telex machine may
have been out of paper or the administrative personnel at the machine
may have failed to carry the message to the banking department. In any
case, Swiss Bank failed to act on the telex, and it was later determined
that Swiss Bank was at fault.
On April 27, the vessel owners again sent a notice of termination to
Hyman-Michaels. Again, the notice was rejected, and Hyman-Michaels
sought to pay the $27,000 to the vessel owners, despite the fact that the
deadline for payment had passed.
In the case of the previous late payment, Hyman-Michaels had wired
the funds directly to the owners' account in Geneva shortly after receiv-
ing the termination notice. However, this time, Hyman-Michaels sought
to make payment indirectly through Swiss Bank in the usual manner illus-
trated above. Time passed while the missing telex from Swiss Bank to the
Banque de Paris was hunted without success. It was not until five days
after the termination notice was sent that Swiss Bank attempted to make
the deposit at the Banque de Paris. However, this time, Banque de Paris
refused the payment.
As before, the issue of termination was submitted to arbitration. This
time, the arbitrators were less inclined to show Hyman-Michaels any lati-
tude. Noting that Hyman-Michaels had not acted promptly after it
learned of the late payment due on April 26, the panel ruled against Hy-
man-Michaels, thereby terminating the charter. .Hyman-Michaels then
sued the banks involved in the funds transfer.
The principal issue in the litigation was whether Swiss Bank was liable
to Hyman-Michaels for the lost profits resulting from the termination of
the charter. Hyman-Michaels had sub-chartered the Pandora at market
rates, which had grown to twice the rates in the charter, and the lost prof-
its, based on the difference between the charter and sub-charter rates,
were estimated to exceed $2 million.
In the decision by Judge Posner, the Evra court applied Illinois com-
mon law, particularly the Illinois progeny of Hadley v. Baxendale, includ-
2001]
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ing Siegel v. Western Union Telephone Co.13 In Siegel, Western Union
negligently misdirected a $200 money order. Had the order been di-
rected properly, the $200 would have been legally bet on a horse that won
and paid $1,650. The plaintiff sued Western Union for the $1,450 "lost
profit." The court, however, applied the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale,
holding that the plaintiff could not recover its lost profit because Western
Union had no knowledge of the use of the funds.
The Evra court concluded that Siegel was authority for exonerating
Swiss Bank, stating that the reason for the holding was to be found in the
"animating principle" of Hadley v. Baxendale: that "the costs of the unto-
ward consequence of a course of dealings should be borne by that party
who was able to avert the consequence at least cost and failed to do so."14
In Evra, the court found that Hyman-Michaels may have been able to
avert the consequences of its breach, but had behaved imprudently. Hav-
ing barely avoided termination after the 1972 late payment, it waited until
the last minute to send instructions to make the April 1973 late payment
that resulted in the termination of the charter. On the day it received the
notice of termination, Hyman-Michaels was imprudent, the court com-
mented, for it failed to "pull out all the stops to get payment to the Ban-
que de Paris on that day, and instead [it dithered] while Continental and
Swiss Bank wasted five days looking for the lost telex message."'15
The Evra court noted the link between the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale
and both the doctrine of avoidable consequences and the tort principle
that limits liability to the "foreseeable consequences" of the defendant's
carelessness. In its emphasis on the failure of Hyman-Michaels to behave
prudently when prudent behavior would apparently have avoided the
loss, Evra may be said to have put a theoretical economics gloss on the
traditional view of Hadley v. Baxendale.16 In any event, the fundamental
holding in Evra, as in Siegel, seems to be simply that only damages that
the defendant might reasonably have foreseen are available to the ag-
grieved party. The Evra court stated, "Swiss Bank did not have enough
information to infer that if it lost a $27,000 payment order it would face a
liability in excess of $2 million.' 7
C. VARIOUS FORMULATIONS OF THE HADLEY v. BAXENDALE
RULE-CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
What are "consequential damages?" Most practitioners would agree
that the term refers to damages that a person in the position of the
breaching party would not reasonably have foreseen at the time of con-
tracting.18 They would also agree that such damages should not be avail-
13. 37 N.E.2d 868 (Il. App. 1941).
14. Evra, 673 F.2d at 957.
15. Id.
16. Judge Posner is a noted exponent of applying economics theory to legal issues. See
An Economic Approach, supra note 1.
17. Evra, 673 F.2d at 956.
18. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 2, at § 1007.
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able to the aggrieved party, or at least that they are not generally
available under the common law. In Hadley v. Baxendale, for example,
the court found that the carriers might not have reasonably foreseen that
the mill owners would sustain lost profits by reason of the delay in deliv-
ering the broken crankshaft. The unforeseeable lost profits of the millers
would thus constitute "consequential damages" (as most practitioners
would use the term today).
Suppose, however, that the millers notified the carriers that a delay in
delivering the broken shaft would result in a shutdown of the mill,
thereby resulting in the mill owners' losing profits? Under these circum-
stances, most practitioners, I believe, would probably agree, in accord
with the decision in Hadley v. Baxendale, that the lost profits would be
available as damages to the mill owners. Would the practitioners also
agree, however, that the lost profits had retained their character as "con-
sequential damages?" Or would they reason that the loss of profits was
no longer "consequential" damages because the loss had become foresee-
able by reason of the notice? The question is not a substantive one, but a
terminological one. If we assume that the lost profits are available to the
millers because of the notice to the carriers, should the damages continue
to be called "consequential" or should they be called something else?
I doubt that most practitioners have given much thought to this ques-
tion, but I suspect that many practitioners might take the view that when
otherwise unforeseeable damages become foreseeable because the
breaching party has advance notice of the circumstances, the damages
should no longer be called consequential. That view would be consistent
with what seems to be the typical application of the term "consequential"
to damages that are not available to the aggrieved party.
In any case, if we wish to distinguish between unforeseeable damages
(the damages conventionally known as "consequential damages") and
otherwise unforeseeable damages that become foreseeable because the
breaching party is advised of the special circumstances, what shall we call
the latter kind of damages? In this paper we will call these damages "ad-
vised consequential damages."
The U.C.C. fails to define the term "consequential damages" although
it uses the term in a number of provisions. Moreover, the term is used
differently in different articles of the U.C.C.
Section 1-106 seems to use the term "consequential damages" in the
most often used sense. In this sense, "consequential damages" are simply
remote and indirect damages that would not normally be reasonably fore-
seeable by the breaching party at the time of contracting. In this simple
sense, consequential damages are normally not recoverable by the
breaching party. Section 1-106(1) of the current version of Article 1 and
Section 1-305(a) of the 2000 Annual Meeting Draft of Article 1 appear to
use the term in this simple sense. They do not indicate whether the term
excludes "advised consequential damages," that is, remote and indirect
2001]
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damages that have become foreseeable because the breaching party is
advised of the special circumstances that give rise to the damages.
A somewhat more complex use of the term "consequential damages"
would exclude "advised consequential damages" and thus make such
damages arguably available to the aggrieved party.
Articles 2 and 2A use the term "consequential damages" idiosyncrati-
cally to refer to recoverable foreseeable damages. As suggested below,
the consequential damages contemplated in Articles 2 and 2A are proba-
bly principally what we call in this paper "advised consequential dam-
ages." Complicating matters a bit further, Articles 2 and 2A add the
concept of "incidental damages." Incidental damages are generally the
costs that the aggrieved party incurs in unwinding the transaction after
the breaching party has breached the sales or lease contract.
Sections 3-411 and 4A-404 allow the aggrieved party to recover "conse-
quential damages" only after receipt of notice of the special circum-
stances that may give rise to the damages. Thus, in these sections, the
term "consequential damages" unambiguously includes "advised conse-
quential damages."
Sections 4-402(b), 4A-305 and 5-111 also use the term "consequential
damages." The use of the term in these and the other sections of the
U.C.C. referred to above are discussed in greater detail in Part II of this
paper.
How have both courts and authors expressed the rule in Hadley v. Bax-
endale? They have formulated a number of distinctions in addition to the
distinction between foreseeable and unforeseeable damages. One such
distinction is between "general" damages and "special" damages. Gen-
eral damages, which are normally available to the aggrieved party, are
said to be the damages that would normally be expected to arise in the
ordinary course from the breach. Special damages (a term used in section
1-106), which are normally not available, are said to be those that arise
from special circumstances that would not ordinarily be foreseeable by
the breaching party. Another formulation is that the recoverable dam-
ages, those that a reasonable person might anticipate would result from
the breach, are "natural" damages. Finally, another distinction that is
often made is between "direct" and "indirect" damages. Direct damages,
sometimes called "proximate" damages, are generally foreseeable dam-
ages, i.e., recoverable damages. Indirect or "remote" damages are usu-
ally special unforeseeable damages that are not recoverable.
"Compensable" is a word that normally means "recoverable." "Com-
pensatory" or "statutory compensatory" damages may be used to mean
recoverable damages as specified under particular provisions of the
U.C.C. (for example, the difference between the market price and the
contract price under section 2-708), and recoverable under the particular
provision (rather than recoverable generally as foreseeable damages as,




Finally, the term "consequential damages" is commonly applied, as we
noted above, in its simplest sense to refer to damages that are said to
arise as a "consequence" of the breach but would not be foreseeable at
the time of contracting to a reasonable person in the position of the
breaching party. In this context, the term "consequential" is virtually sy-
nonymous with the terms "unforeseeable," "indirect," "special," and "re-
mote" and antonymous with the terms "foreseeable," direct," "general,"
"natural," "ordinary" and the like. In this simple sense, consequential
damages are not recoverable, but they may become recoverable when the
aggrieved party has given notice of the special circumstances giving rise
to the damages to the breaching party or when the breaching party other-
wise is aware of the special circumstances. In this paper, we use the term
"advised consequential damages" to describe damages that have changed
their character in this manner in order to distinguish them from conse-
quential damages that are not advised to the breaching party and thus
generally not recoverable.
Of course, many of these terms overlap others. The reader may well
have formed the opinion at this point that the use of these terms is more
complicated than it needs to be. It's no surprise that Professor Corbin
favored couching the rules simply in terms of foreseeability and advo-
cated that the use of the term "consequential damages" be abandoned. 19
The confusion resulting from the plethora of damages terms described
above may be seen in the use of the term in "consequential damages"
clauses commonly used in contract provisions in which a party disclaims
its liability for such damages. The disclaimer is intended normally to con-
stitute a waiver by one party, the waiving party, of its right to seek dam-
ages from the other party when the other party, the disclaiming party,
would not ordinarily reasonably have foreseen the damages.
The drafters of consequential damages clauses commonly make two er-
rors. First, the disclaimers often have the waiving party disclaim its right
to "incidental" as well as "consequential" damages, as in the following
example from the American Bar Association's Model Electronic Pay-
ments Agreement and Commentary:20 "9.3 Neither party shall be liable to
the other under this Agreement for any special, incidental or consequent-
ial damages... [Emphasis supplied]."
Counsel for the waiving party very often fails to object to the waiver of
incidental damages in the mistaken belief that incidental damages are the
same as, or a form of, consequential damages. As noted in this paper, the
term is used in Articles 2 and 2A to refer to expenses incurred by the
aggrieved party in the unwinding of the sales or lease transaction after
19. See id. §1011.
20. The Agreement, often referred to as the "Model Trading Partners Agreement," is
the product of the ABA's Electronic Data Interchange and Information Technology Divi-
sion of the Section on Science and Technology. It is available from the ABA at Publication
Orders, P.O. Box 10892, Chicago, IL 60610-0892, 1-800-285-2221. See also section 5B2 of
the Home Banking Agreement (4th draft dated February 15, 2000) produced by the Task
Force on Home Banking Agreement in my files but not yet publicly available.
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the breach has occurred. Incidental damages should not normally be
waived.
Second, the disclaiming party may mean to include "advised conse-
quential damages" in the disclaimer but fail to do so in the belief that
"consequential damages" include advised consequential damages. A pru-
dent drafter for the disclaiming party would probably want to couch the
disclaimer along the following lines:
Neither party shall be liable to the other under this Agreement for any
special or consequential damages even if such party has been advised of
the possibility of such damages... [Emphasis supplied]. 21
D. THE RESTATEMENT FORMULATION OF THE HADLEY V.
BAXENDALE RULE
Professor Corbin was a consultant to the Second Restatement of Con-
tracts project, and the Restatement drafters followed his counsel that the
term "consequential damages" "should be abandoned.122 The Restate-
ment drafters then couched the rule in terms of foreseeability and omit-
ted the term "consequential damages. '23 The Restatement formulation
states:
(1) Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did
not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when
the contract was made.
(2) Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because
it follows from the breach
(a) in the ordinary course of events, or
(b) as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary
course of events, that the party in breach had reason to know.24
The Comment in the Restatement to the rule quoted above further
explains the application of the rule:
The mere circumstance that some loss was foreseeable, or even that
some loss of the same general kind was foreseeable, will not suffice if
the loss that actually occurred was not foreseeable. It is enough,
however, that the loss was foreseeable as a probable, as distinguished
from a necessary, result of his breach. Furthermore, the party in
21. Section 9.3 of the Model Electronic Payments Agreement and Commentary. See
also section 6.3 of the ABA's Model Funds Transfer Services Agreement and Commentary,
available as indicated in the preceding footnote. For a model that fails to cover advised
consequential damages, see section VB2 of the Home Banking Agreement referred to in
the preceding footnote; see also section 16(a) of the Letter of Credit Application and Agree-
ment by James G. Barnes published in Uniform Laws Annotated, vol. 4, Uniform Commer-
cial Code Forms and Materials, §5-104-Form 11; West's Legal Forms, vol. 15 Commercial
Transactions, § 62.3-Form.5; and Uniform Commercial Code Legal Forms, vol. 2, § 5A:6.
22. See supra note 2.
23. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 uses the term "consequential loss" to
"include such items as injury to person or property resulting from defective performance."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347, cmt. c. (1981). The aggrieved party's right
to consequential loss under the Restatement is subject to the general foreseeability re-
quirements of the rule in section 351, which omits the word "consequential" entirely.
24. Id. § 351(1)(2)(a)(b).
[Vol. 54
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
breach need not have made a "tacit agreement" to be liable for the
loss. Nor must he have had the loss in mind when making the con-
tract, for the test is an objective one based on what he had reason to
foresee. There is no requirement of foreseeability with respect to the
injured party.25 In spite of these qualifications, the requirement of
foreseeability is a more severe limitation of liability than is the re-
quirement of substantial or "proximate" cause in the case of an ac-
tion in tort or for breach of warranty.2 6
As to the terminology, and in particular to the use of the term "conse-
quential damages":
The damages recoverable for loss that results other than in the ordi-
nary course of events are sometimes called "special" or "consequent-
ial" damages. These terms are often misleading, however, and it is
not necessary to distinguish between "general" and "special" or
"consequential" damages for purposes of the rule .... 27
II. CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES UNDER THE U.C.C.
Article 1
Section 1-305(a) of the 2000 Annual Meeting Draft of Article 1 is
quoted in the introduction to this paper. Both that version and section 1-
106(1) of the current version of Article 1 generally provide that conse-
quential or special damages "may not be had" except as specifically pro-
vided in the Uniform Commercial Code or "by other rule of law."
The term "consequential damages" would seem to be used in Article 1
in the simplest sense of the term, that is, to refer to damages that a person
in the position of the breaching party would not reasonably have foreseen
at the time of contracting. If the breaching party had been advised at the
time of contracting of the special circumstances giving rise to the dam-
ages, the damages would thus become foreseeable. Would they then re-
main unavailable within the ambit of the Article 1 provision? Stated
otherwise, are such damages, which we refer to in this paper as "advised
consequential damages," generally available or not available to the ag-
grieved party under Article 1 of the U.C.C.? Article 1 is ambiguous with
respect to this question.
The phrase "other rule of law" is also used ambiguously. Consequent-
ial damages would seem to be available under section 1-106(1) of the
current Article 1 and section 1-305(a) of the 2000 Annual Meeting Draft
of Article 1 only when explicitly authorized under other provisions of the
U.C.C. or under other statutory law. Conceivably, however, "other rule
of law" may include the common law or even mean that the damages are
25. The aggrieved party's ability to foresee the damages is irrelevant under the con-
temporary version of the rule. In Hadley v. Baxendale, the damages would have been
those "as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at
the time they made the contract as the probable result of the breach of it [emphasis sup-
plied]." See supra note 10.
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351, cmt. a.
27. Id. at § 351, cmt. b.
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generally available, except to the extent that other rules of law make
them unavailable. This ambiguity has been noted,28 but the drafters of
section 1-305(a) of the 2000 Annual Meeting Draft of Article 1 have not
addressed it.
Articles 2 and 2A
Article 2 governs the rights and obligations of sellers and buyers in the
sale of goods. Article 2A governs the rights and obligations of lessors
and lessees in the lease of goods.
Articles 2 and 2A, uniquely among the articles of the U.C.C., provide
for three kinds of damages: (i) "statutory compensatory" (the term is the
author's term and not a term used in the U.C.C.): (ii) "incidental;" and
(iii) "consequential" (in the special sense in which that term is used in
Articles 2 and 2A.). To aid in understanding what constitutes conse-
quential damages under these articles, it is helpful briefly to review the
other kinds of damages available under Articles 2 and 2A.
The term "statutory compensatory" or "compensatory" damages, as
used in this paper, refers to damages available under provisions in which
Articles 2 and 2A specify how to calculate particular damages. To calcu-
late the damages due to a buyer of goods, for example, when the seller
has wrongfully repudiated the contract or failed to deliver the goods, Ar-
ticle 2 specifies alternative formulas under which the buyer may recover
(i) the difference between the cost of alternative goods purchased by the
buyer and the contract price of the goods that were to have been deliv-
ered by the seller 29 or (ii) the difference between the market price and
the contract price. 30 If the aggrieved buyer has accepted the goods, Arti-
cle 2 provides that the buyer may recover the loss resulting in the ordi-
nary course of events from the seller's breach. 31 If the seller is in breach
of warranty with respect to the accepted goods, Article 2 provides that
the buyer may recover the difference in value between the goods and the
value they would have had if they had been as warranted. 32
Other compensatory damages provisions in Article 2 specify how to
calculate the damages due to the seller when the buyer is in breach of
contract. 33 Similar provisions of Article 2A specify how to calculate com-
pensatory damages in the case of the lessor's or the lessee's breach.34 All
of these damages, due to the aggrieved party under Articles 2 and 2A, are
referred to in this paper as "statutory compensatory" damages.
"Incidental" damages, the second category of recoverable damages
under Articles 2 and 2A, are generally costs associated with the unrav-
28. See HAWKLAND, U.C.C. SERIES § 1-106:4 (Supp. 2000) [hereinafter HAWKLAND,
U.C.C. SERIES].
29. See U.C.C. § 2-712.
30. See id. § 2-713.
31. See id. § 2-714.
32. See id.
33. See id. §§ 2-708 - 2-709.
34. See generally U.C.C. §§ 2A-508 - 2A-532.
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eling of the sales or lease transaction after the breach has occurred. Inci-
dental damages resulting from a breach by the seller under Article 2, for
example, include costs incurred by the buyer in (i) rejecting nonconform-
ing goods, (ii) purchasing alternative goods, and (iii) taking care of deliv-
ered goods before they have been rejected. 35 Incidental damages
resulting from a breach by the buyer under Article 2 include expenses
incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of
goods after the buyer's breach, and in connection with the return or re-
sale of the goods.36
The incidental damages due to the aggrieved lessor or lessee under Ar-
ticle 2A are similar to those due an aggrieved party under Article 2.37
Incidental damages are specified in lists that are not intended to be ex-
haustive in sections 2-710, 2-715(1), 2A-520(1), and 2A-530.38 These inci-
dental damages are recoverable in addition to the compensatory damages
described above.
The third category of damages recoverable under Articles 2 and 2A is
"consequential damages." These consequential damages are not the
same as the consequential damages that are unavailable in section 1-106.
The term is not defined in Articles 2 or 2A, but under provisions that
state what consequential damages "include," it seems that the term is in-
tended principally to refer in Articles 2 and 2A to what we have desig-
nated above as "advised consequential damages." These are damages that
would not ordinarily be foreseeable, but have become foreseeable be-
cause the breaching party was aware at the time of contracting of the
special circumstances that gave rise to the damages. These special cir-
cumstances are called "particular requirements and needs" in Articles 2
and 2A. For example, under the "include" clause in Article 2, "conse-
quential damages" resulting from the seller's breach include: "any loss
resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the
seller at the time of contracting had reason to know. . . ."[emphasis
added]39
Similarly, under the "include" clause in section 2A-520(2), "conse-
quential damages" resulting from the lessor's breach include losses result-
ing from general or particular requirements and needs of which the lessor
at the time of contracting had reason to know.
35. See HAWKLAND, U.C.C. SERIES, supra note 28, § 2-715:2. Under section 2-715(1),
incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include "expenses reasonably in-
curred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully re-
jected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with
effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or breach." Id.
36. See U.C.C. § 2-710.
37. See id. §§ 2A-520, 2A-530.
38. Section 2-710 applies to the seller's damages and section 2-715 to the buyer's dam-
ages in sales transactions. Section 2A-520 applies to the lessee's damages and section 2A-
530 to the lessor's damages in lease transactions.
39. U.C.C. § 2-715(2). The damages may only be recovered when they "could not
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise." Id.
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The seller or lessor, of course, would normally have reason to know of
the "general" requirements and needs of the buyer or lessee. While dam-
ages arising from these requirements and needs may be literally recover-
able as consequential damages under the foregoing described provisions,
they would also, under normal circumstances, probably be recoverable
under other provisions of Articles 2 and 2A as statutory compensatory
damages.
Thus, for example, if the market price of the goods exceeds the con-
tract price, a reasonable person in the position of the seller would be
aware that the damages to the buyer resulting from the seller's failure to
deliver the goods would include the difference between the prices. These
damages would arise out of the "general" needs of the buyer and would
literally be recoverable as "consequential damages" under the provisions
quoted above, but they also would be recoverable as compensable dam-
ages under section 2-708. Thus the "consequential damages" recoverable
as such by the buyer or lessee under Articles 2 and 2A, (i) would not be
the remote, indirect damages that are typically thought of as "conse-
quential damages" and (ii) would not normally be the "general" foresee-
able damages that may be thought of as the "natural" consequences of
the breach. The former would not be recoverable at all, and the latter
would normally be recoverable as compensable damages.
Rather, the "consequential damages" recoverable as such under Arti-
cles 2 and 2A would principally be the special, indirect, remote damages
that would not ordinarily be foreseeable, but, in the particular case, are
foreseeable because the breaching party is aware of the special circum-
stances, that is, the "particular requirements and needs" of the aggrieved
party that have given rise to the damages. These are the damages we
refer to in this paper as "advised consequential damages."
In addition to advised consequential damages, the Articles 2 and 2A
consequential damages would include such foreseeable incidental dam-
ages and compensatory general damages as might not be recoverable as
such under Articles 2 and 2A. These would be recoverable as conse-
quential damages resulting from the "general" requirements and needs of
the aggrieved party of which the breaching party has reason to know.
Finally, consequential damages under Articles 2 and 2A also include
injury to persons or property when the damages "proximately" result
from a breach of warranty.40
It may be noted here that consequential damages are not available to
the seller or lessor when the buyer or lessee is in breach under the current
versions of Articles 2 and 2A. These damages would be available, how-
ever, under the 2000 Annual Meeting Drafts of these Articles. 41
Professor Hawkland's review of damages cases under Articles 2 and
2A yields an analysis that is similar to the foregoing analysis. He states
40. See id. §§ 2-715(2)(b), 2A-520(2)(b).
41. See U.C.C. §§ 2-708 - 2-710, §§ 2A-527 - 2A-530 (Proposed Draft 2000).
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that many courts have found three elements with respect to which the
recovery of damages is available. 42 First, the aggrieved party can recover
damages resulting in the ordinary course of events from the breach.
These are "ordinary," "proximate," "general," or "natural," and may be
had, Professor Hawkland states, without proof of foreseeability. Second,
the aggrieved party can recover damages that a reasonable person would
have foreseen "in the great multitude of cases." Here the actual loss that
occurred must have been foreseeable. Third, the aggrieved party can re-
cover damages that flow from special circumstances that were communi-
cated to the breaching party at the time of contracting "assuming these
losses were foreseeable consequences of the breach in the light of the fact
that the promisor had knowledge or reason to know of these special cir-
cumstances. ' 43 Professor Hawkland's third category is embodied in the
term "advised consequential damages" as used in this paper.
We have noted that the term consequential damages is typically used in
contract clauses and by the 'courts as a synonym for "special" or "indi-
rect" damages, that is, for damages resulting from requirements and
needs of which the defendant at the time of contracting did not have rea-
son to know. This usage is directly the opposite of the usage in Articles 2
and 2A. Stated differently, the term "consequential damages" is typically
used to mean damages that are not reasonably foreseeable, while Articles
2 and 2A use the term to mean damages that are reasonably foreseeable.
In my view, the U.C.C. would have better served practitioners if it had
made uniform the use of the term instead of perpetuating its conflicting
use.
Despite the conflict in terminology, however, the damages formula-
tions in Articles 2 and 2A are entirely consistent with the rule formulated
in Hadley v. Baxendale and, for that matter, with the consequential dam-
ages provisions in the other articles of the U.C.C. The difference is not in
the results that the different formulations would produce but rather in the
formulations themselves.
Articles 2 and 2A use "include" clauses virtually to define "conse-
quential damages" to mean foreseeable damages, and then make conse-
quential damages available to the aggrieved party. Hadley v. Baxendale
makes foreseeable damages available to the aggrieved party without the
use of any definition. Article 1, and other U.C.C. Articles not including
Articles 2 and 2A, make consequential damages either available or not
available without defining the term but in a manner that seems generally
consistent with the results in Hadley v. Baxendale and Articles 2 and 2A
(though not entirely free from ambiguity).
Articles 3, 4 and 4A
Article 3 applies to negotiable instruments, Article 4 to bank deposits
and collections, and Article 4A to electronic funds transfers.





Section 3-411 applies to a bank that has become obligated to pay a
check by accepting a certified check or issuing a cashier's check or teller's
check. Subsection (b) provides that the person seeking to enforce the
check "may recover consequential damages if the obligated bank refuses
to pay after receiving notice of particular circumstances giving rise to the
damages."'44
The rule in section 3-411 is clear. The bank is liable only to .the extent
that the bank has notice of the possibility of the damages, but after the
notice is received, the term "consequential" would seemingly make the
bank liable for the actual damages no matter how unforeseeable, indirect
or remote they would otherwise have been. The bank avoids liability,
however, when the bank's refusal occurs because the bank has suspended
payments, asserts a defense that it reasonably believes is available against
the person seeking to enforce the check, has a reasonable doubt whether
the person seeking to enforce the check is entitled to payment, or pay-
ment is prohibited by law.
Section 4-103
Under section 4-103(e), the measure of damages for the bank's failure
to exercise ordinary care in handling a check is the amount of the check
less an amount that would have been realized by the exercise of ordinary
care. If there is also bad faith, the damages include "any other damages
the party suffered as a proximate consequence. '45 The provision may not
be, strictly speaking, a "consequential damages" provision because it fails
to use that term. By making the bank liable, however, for "any other
damages the party suffered as a proximate consequence" of the bank's
conduct, the provision seems to make the bank liable for consequential
damages provided the "proximateness" test is satisfied. 46 Official Com-
ment 6 to section 4-103 states that the proximateness of the damages
sought is to be tested by "the ordinary rules applied in comparable
cases."'47 The cases would presumably include cases in which the issue is
the availability of consequential damages, although there seems to be less
of an element, or no element at all, of "reasonable foreseeability" in de-
termining "proximate cause" than in determining whether damages are
"consequential" damages.
Section 4-402(b)
Under section 4-402(b), a bank that wrongfully dishonors a check is
liable to its customer for damages "proximately caused" by the wrongful
dishonor. The bank's liability is limited to actual damages proved and
44. U.C.C. § 3-411(b).
45. See id. § 4-103(e).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 4-103, cmt. 6.
[Vol. 54
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
may even include damages for an arrest or prosecution of the customer
"or other consequential damages." The category of "other consequential
damages" is quite broad and could include mental distress.48
Section 4A-305
Section 4A-305 specifies the damages available to the sender of wire
transfer instructions when the receiving bank fails to execute the sender's
instructions properly and, as a result of the bank's improper execution, (i)
payment to the beneficiary of the transfer is delayed, 49 (ii) the transfer is
not completed, 50 (iii) an intermediary bank designated by the originator
is not utilized, 51 or (iv) the receiving bank issues instructions that do not
comply with the terms of the originator's instructions.52 It also specifies
the damages available when the receiving bank fails to execute instruc-
tions that it was obliged by express written agreement to execute. 53
Under any of these circumstances, 54 the available damages include inter-
est, the recovery of interest losses, the originator's expenses in the funds
transfer, and incidental expenses.55 They do not include any other
amounts unless the bank has expressly agreed in writing to pay the other
amounts.
The drafters of Article 4A had the decision in Evra v. Swiss Bank,56
discussed in detail in Part I of this paper above, very much in mind when
they wrote section 4A-305. In Evra, the plaintiffs sought damages result-
ing from the failure of intermediary Swiss Bank to act on wire transfer
instructions to transfer $27,000. As a result of Swiss Bank's failure to act,
the plaintiffs lost vessel charter rights worth in excess of $2 million and
sought to recover their losses as damages from Swiss Bank. Applying the
rule in Hadley v. Baxendale,57 the court ruled that the plaintiffs could not
recover the value of the lost charter rights because Swiss Bank could not
be held to have knowledge of the circumstances giving rise to the loss.
48. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 21-
4(4th ed. 1995) [hereinafter WHITE AND SUMMERS].
49. U.C.C. § 4A-305(a).
50. Id. § 4A-305(b).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. § 4A-305(d)
54. The remedies provided in section 4A-305 do not apply to the bank's execution of
fraudulent payment instructions (sections 4A-201 through 4A-204), to the bank's errors in
making transfers (section 4A-303), to the bank's compliance with instructions in which the
beneficiary or a bank is misdescribed (sections 4A-207 and 4A-208), or to the failure of the
beneficiary's bank to pay the beneficiary after accepting a payment order for the benefici-
ary's account (section 4A-404).
55. It is not clear what the drafters meant by "incidental expenses." For the suggestion
that plaintiffs might seek to argue that damages generally thought to be consequential are
instead incidental and thus available, see WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 44, § 25-3 et
seq. The bank's liability under these section 4A-305 provisions runs to the originator or
beneficiary (subsection (a)), the originator (subsection (b)) or the sender (subsection (d)).
56. Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982).
57. 9 Exch. 341,156 E. R. 145 (1854) (reprinted in ALL E. R. REP. 1843-1860, 461
(G.F.L. Bridgman ed., Butterworth & Co. Ltd 1965)).
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The exposure of banks in the United States to large sums as conse-
quential damages for failure to comply with wire transfer instructions was
a significant factor in the decision to write the new Article 4A on funds
transfers.58 The Official Comments state with respect to the Evra opinion:
"If Evra means that consequential damages can be imposed if the culpa-
ble bank has notice of particular circumstances giving rise to the dam-
ages, it does not provide an acceptable solution to the problem of bank
liability for consequential damages." 59
The drafters of Article 4A wanted to make "consequential damages"
unavailable to the sender of wire transfer instructions when the receiving
bank failed to comply with the instructions. They wanted also to make
"advised consequential damage" unavailable to the sender under these
circumstances. Stated otherwise, they wanted to make remote, indirect
and normally unforeseeable damages, i.e. "consequential damages," not
available to the sender even when the bank was aware of the special cir-
cumstances giving rise to the damages.
To ensure that a receiving bank would not be liable to the sender for
consequential damages (except only when the bank has expressly agreed
in writing to assume such liability) - however the term "consequential
damages" may be defined - the drafters of section 4A-305 specified in
subsections (a), (b) and (d) the available damages described above. Then
in subsections (c) and (d), they provided simply that in addition to the
specified recoverable damages, other damages, "including consequential
damages," are recoverable only "to the extent provided in an express
written agreement of the receiving bank."'60 The drafter thus deftly
avoided any ambiguity that might arise by reason of'the use of the term
"consequential." Only the specified damages are available. Consequent-
ial damages-whatever the term may mean-are not available.
Of course, if Evra were to be decided today, the exclusion of all dam-
ages for the wrongs specified under section 4A-305 other than the dam-
ages specified in the section would insulate Swiss Bank from any claim
for the more than $2 million sought by the plaintiffs. Moreover, absent
any written agreement by Swiss Bank to execute wire transfer instruc-
tions received from Continental Bank, Swiss Bank would not be obliged
to act on the instructions and hence not obliged to pay any damages-not
even interest, incidental expenses or the plaintiffs' expenses in the wire
transfer transaction. Even if one were to assume that Swiss Bank had
entered into a written agreement to execute Continental Bank's wire
58. See PAUL S. TURNER, LAW OF PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND EFT § 4.02[A] (Aspen
Law & Business 1999). Banks and bank regulators were concerned that large losses could
lead to systemic failures.
59. U.C.C. § 4A-305, cmt. 2.
60. Id. § 4A-305(c) and (d). In section 4A-305(e), the drafters also provided a limited
right of the aggrieved party to recover its attorney's fees. Attorney's fees are not available
under the section when the claim is based on the bank's failure to execute the instructions
and the funds transfer agreement provides for damages (presumably any damages-not
just damages for failure to execute instructions).
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transfer instructions, the agreement would be enforceable (i) only by
Continental Bank, not by the plaintiffs, who had no privity with Swiss
Bank and (ii) only to the extent the bank expressly agreed to assume the
damages.
Section 4A-404
Section 4A-404(a) is very similar to section 3-411 described above. The
latter allows the holder of a cashier's check, teller's check or certified
check to recover consequential damages when the bank fails to pay the
check without any of the excuses justifying non-payment specified in the
section. Section 4A-404 allows the beneficiary of a wire transfer to re-
cover consequential damages from the beneficiary's bank when the bank
refuses to pay the beneficiary after the bank has accepted an incoming
payment order for the beneficiary's account unless the bank proves that
its reason for non-payment was based on a reasonable doubt concerning
the right of the beneficiary to payment. Thus if a customer's bank that
has accepted an incoming payment order for the benefit of the customer
refuses to pay the customer, the bank may be liable to the customer for
consequential damages resulting from the refusal "to the extent the bank
had notice of the damages .... "61
It may be noted here that sections 3-411 and 4A-404 both make dam-
ages labeled "consequential damages" available when the bank has been
explicitly advised of the special circumstances giving rise to the damages.
Stated differently, the term "consequential damages" is used in a manner
that makes clear that the damages available under these sections include
what we have called "advised consequential damages."
This usage might support an argument that where the term appears
elsewhere in a U.C.C. provision that makes consequential damages un-
available, advised consequential damages are also unavailable. On this
basis, the section 1-106 rule that consequential damages may not "be
had" would make advised consequential damages also unrecoverable not-
withstanding their foreseeability by the breaching party. This argument
would hardly seem definitive, however, in the absence of any indication
that section 1-106 was intended to overrule the foreseeability rules of
Hadley v. Baxendale.
Article 5
Article 5 governs the rights and obligations of the parties in letter of
credit transactions. The remedies available under Article 5 are specified
in section 5-115, which provides generally that consequential damages are
not available to an aggrieved beneficiary from a bank that wrongfully
dishonors the beneficiary's presentation of documents, 62 not available to
an aggrieved applicant from a bank that wrongfully honors the presenta-
61. Id. § 4A-404(a).
62. See U.C.C. § 5-115(1).
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tion, 63 and not available to an aggrieved beneficiary or applicant from an
advising bank or bank nominated to pay under the letter of credit that is
liable under Article 5.64
As an example of a claim for consequential damages by a beneficiary,
let us suppose that Lender, a commercial loan company, and Borrower
are parties to a Note Agreement pursuant to which Lender loans
$500,000 to Borrower. To support Borrower's obligations under the Note
Agreement, Borrower applies to Issuing Bank to have Issuing Bank issue
a standby letter of credit to Lender. The letter of credit would obligate
Issuing Bank to pay Lender upon the presentation a certificate to Issuing
Bank prior to the expiration date of the credit. The letter of credit re-
quires that the certificate presented to Issuing Bank state: "Borrower is in
default under the Note Agreement and the sum of $ _ is due and
owing to the undersigned Lender. The undersigned Lender hereby de-
mands payment thereof."
In response to Borrower's application, Issuing Bank issues the letter of
credit in the amount of $500,000 to Lender. In Article 5 parlance, Issuing
Bank is now the "Issuer," and the Issuer is obliged to pay Lender, which
has now become the "Beneficiary," upon timely receipt of the certificate.
Borrower, now the "Applicant," is obliged to reimburse the Issuer if the
Issuer pays the Beneficiary against receipt of a properly worded
certificate.
Suppose that the Beneficiary presents a properly worded certificate,
but the Issuer wrongfully refuses to pay the Beneficiary. If the Benefici-
ary prevails in litigation against the Issuer, the Beneficiary will be entitled
to judgment for the amount stated in the certificate up to the $500,000
amount of the credit. Suppose, however, that the Beneficiary can prove
that because of the Issuer's failure to pay, the Beneficiary was compelled
to default under its major credit agreement, and as a result of that default
and cross-default provisions in its other loan agreements, Beneficiary was
driven into insolvency with losses that support a damages claim of $10
million. Can the Beneficiary's trustee in bankruptcy recover the $10 mil-
lion damages?
The answer must be "no" because the damages are remote and indirect
and were not reasonably foreseeable by Issuer at the time the letter of
credit was issued. In short, the damages are the very "consequential
damages" that section 5-115(a) makes unavailable to the aggrieved bene-
ficiary. (If there were no section 5-115, the damages would nevertheless
presumably be unavailable under section 1-106.)
Suppose, however, that the Issuer had been aware of the financial con-
dition of the Beneficiary and in particular was advised that if it failed to
pay under the letter of credit, the Beneficiary would be driven into insol-
vency with resulting huge losses. Would the knowledge of the Issuer




make a difference that would allow the Beneficiary's bankruptcy trustee
to recover the $10 million?
Let us consider another example, this time to illustrate a claim by the
applicant for consequential damages. The applicant might suffer conse-
quential damages as a result of either the wrongful honor or the wrongful
dishonor of the beneficiary's presentation. In this example, the Benefici-
ary owns the ocean-going vessel Pandora and has given possession of the
vessel to the Applicant under a long-term vessel charter. Payments of
$27,000 are due periodically under the charter, and these payments are to
be made by the Issuer to the Beneficiary under a "direct pay" standby
letter of credit. In the letter of credit, the Issuer undertakes to pay each
of the $27,000 installments under the charter to the Beneficiary upon
Beneficiary's presentation to the Issuer of a document stating: "$27,000 is
due and payable under the Charter on _ , 2001 and will become
past due on _ , 2001. Demand for $27,000 is hereby made."
The Beneficiary timely presents a properly worded document demand-
ing payment of $27,000, but the Issuer refuses to pay the Beneficiary.
The payment becomes past due, and the resulting default allows the Ben-
eficiary to terminate the charter and repossess the Pandora.
The Applicant sues the Issuer under section 5-115(b), which allows an
applicant to recover actual damages resulting from the Issuer's wrongful
dishonor "but not consequential damages." The Applicant had sub-
chartered the Pandora at rates that were twice those paid by the Appli-
cant to the vessel's owners. If the charter had not been terminated, the
Applicant would have realized $2 million in net subcharter income over
the remaining term of the charter. May the Applicant recover the $2
million lost profits?
The Applicant's $2 million lost profits would surely be unrecoverable
as precisely the kind of "consequential damages" that are made unavaila-
ble under section 5-115(b). The lost subcharter income could not reason-
ably have been foreseen by the Issuer. Would the damages be
recoverable, however, if the Issuer had been made aware of the special
circumstances prior to issuing the letter of credit? This example, of
course, is modeled on the facts in Evra v. Swiss Bank. If Evra applies and
is not overruled by section 5-115, the damages would be available to the
Beneficiary if the Issuer had been aware of the circumstances.
Is Evra overruled by section 5-115? By contrast with the drafters of
Article 5, the drafters of Article 4A unambiguously overruled Evra v.
Swiss Bank and Hadley v. Baxendale with respect to the availability of
advised consequential damages when a bank fails to comply with wire
transfer instructions. Section 4A-305 specifies precisely the damages that
are available from a bank that fails to execute wire transfer instructions
and then provides that no other damages-including "consequential dam-
ages"-are available.
By contrast, the drafters of section 5-115 state simply that "consequent-
ial damages" are not recoverable. Since the term consequential damages
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is not defined in Article 5 or elsewhere in the U.C.C.,65 it is not clear
whether remote and indirect damages that are consequential and thus not
available under section 5-115 become available when the breaching party
is aware of the special circumstances. Thus we cannot definitively answer
the question posed in either of the foregoing examples.
In the process of drafting the current version of Article 5 completed in
1995, the Article 5 drafters rejected a proposal to include a provision
modeled on sections 3-411 and 4A-404 discussed above. The rejected
provision would have allowed a beneficiary to recover "consequential
damages" for wrongful dishonor by the issuer provided that the issuer
had notice of the special circumstances giving rise to the damages and the
issuer was unable to show that its wrongful dishonor was based on a rea-
sonable doubt concerning the right of the beneficiary to payment.
In the drafting process, the banks understandably sought to limit their
liability in general and in particular sought to avoid exposure to conse-
quential damages. Yet the proposal seemed to its proponents, including
myself, a fairly mild one that would only rarely apply.66
The rejection of the proposal indicates the unwillingness of many of the
drafting participants to expose the banks to consequential damages. The
rejection further suggests that had the drafters thought about the matter
and had the issue been put to them, they might have decided to make
clear that the term "consequential damages" in section 5-115 includes ad-
vised consequential damages. Stated differently, the drafters might have
decided to provide that remote, indirect and unforeseeable damages are
not available under section 5-115 even when the issuer is aware at the
time of issuance of the special circumstances giving rise to the damages.
Of course, the Article 5 drafters failed to do any such thing, however, and
that failure suggests that the rule laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale and
followed by Evra v. Swiss Bank and by the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts is the rule under the U.C.C. On this basis, section 5-115 might al-
low the recovery of remote and indirect "consequential damages" when
the issuer was advised of the special circumstances giving rise to the dam-
ages at the time the letter of credit was issued.
Articles 6, 7, 8 and 9
UCC Articles 6, 7, 8 and 9 do not refer to consequential damages. It
seems likely that other law, possibly other law under the U.C.C. or gen-
eral contract law, would govern the availability of remedies in disputes
under these Articles. In any case, consequential damages are generally
65. The unique "include" clauses in Articles 2 and 2A that state that consequential
damages "include" foreseeable damages confuse the analysis but clearly are irrelevant to
the issue whether consequential damages include advised consequential damages in the
context of Article 5.
66. See Donald J. Rapson, Who Is Looking Out for the Public Interest? Thoughts
About the UCC Revision Process in the Light (and Shadows) of Professor Rubin's Observa-
tions, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 249, 275 (1994). I represented the Treasury Management As-
sociation, the proponent of the proposal, in the Article 5 drafting process.
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not available under these Articles by reason of the general provision
making them unavailable in section 1-106. We have already noted the
ambiguity with respect to the availability of remote and indirect damages
under Article 1 when the breaching party knew the special circumstances
giving rise to the damages at the time of contracting.
III. CONCLUSION
In the nearly half-century of the existence of the U.C.C., the issue of
the availability of consequential damages under the U.C.C. does not seem
to have been a particularly troublesome one in the courts. Thus while the
issues noted in this paper may be thought of as having at least some theo-
retical vitality, they do not appear to have impeded the resolution of
cases under the U.C.C.67 Yet, to my mind, it is axiomatic that terms
should be used clearly and consistently in legislation, especially in a series
of uniform model laws, and even more especially in a series of uniform
model laws collectively denominated as a "Code." That the term "conse-
quential damages" is not used clearly and consistently in the U.C.C.
seems, therefore, to justify the complaints, however mild, recorded in this
paper.
The principal ambiguity noted in this paper concerns the availability of
remote and unforeseeable damages when the breaching party has notice
at the time of contracting of the special circumstances giving rise to the
damages. The Article 1 drafters may have thought that the issue is best
left for the courts to decide on the facts in the particular case and under
the particular U.C.C. Article in which the issue arises.
The use of the term "consequential damages" in Articles 2 and 2A to
denote foreseeable losses has always seemed lamentable to me. In the
other parts of the U.C.C. and in the wide universe of contract law gener-
ally, the term typically denotes unforeseeable losses. In the course of pre-
paring this paper, however, it has become clear to me that this is only at
bottom a stylistic complaint, and much less significant than the fact that
the conflicting usage, confusing as it may seem to me at the threshold, has
seemed to work well in the narrow universe of Articles 2 and 2A.
It seems only appropriate, then, as revisions to the U.C.C. are nearly at
an end, to conclude this paper with hearty congratulations to the uniform
law commissioners. The revisions to the entire Code, when finally ap-
proved, will have constituted a monumental achievement.
67. In Illinois, the cases involving consequential damages under Articles 1, 2 and 2A
have been very well summarized in WILLIAM B. DAVENPORT ET AL., ILLINOIS PRACTICE,
vol. 2A, (West Publishing Co. 1997). The summaries indicate no confusion on the part of
the courts that suggest the necessity of revisions to Articles 1, 2 or 2A.
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